One can call anyone who argues along the lines of (ASA) a "neo-Moorean" or simply a "Moorean". To be sure, there is more to what is nowadays called "neo-Mooreanism" or "Mooreanism" 2 ; however, for lack of a better term I will use these terms here and apply it to any defender of (ASA) we do know many ordinary propositions. Let us see what kind of anti-sceptical strategy he has on offer and whether any of that comes even close to dealing with arguments like the ones just mentioned. I will come to the conclusion that Moore was not a Moorean. It will also turn out in particular that Moore's famous proof in "Proof of an External World" raises a number of puzzling issues, especially when that paper is read in the light of other papers written at about the same time. Moore's stance on scepticism is much less straightforward than many believe.
Since Moore has said quite different things about scepticism in different papers, we need to discuss his relevant papers individually. I will first take a look at "A Defence of
Common Sense" (1925) (I) and then take a close look at his "Proof of an External World"
(1939) (II). The latter paper is the most interesting one in our context. Some remarks
Moore makes at about the time he wrote Proof -especially in "Certainty" (1941) -raise the problem of meta-scepticism (III). There are hints -in particular in "Four Forms of Scepticism" (1940) -to a response to meta-scepticism in some of Moore´s remarks about common sense and philosophy (IV). The latter two sections are meant as further explorations relevant to (II). I attach an appendix with a less historical point and try out an anti-Moorean strategy which uses an analogy between arguments against epistemological scepticism and arguments against moral scepticism.
I. Ordinary Propositions?
In "A Defence of Common Sense" (1925) Moore presents the reader with his well-known list of ordinary propositions which he claims we do know (cf. Defence, 33-34; cf. also his list at the beginning of Certainty, 227 as well as, e.g., Skirry 2003 More importantly, one should notice that for Reid those propositions also constitute the content of principles of knowledge. Reid clearly is a foundationalist whereas Moore remains silent on questions concerning the structure of knowledge, at least in so far as ordinary propositions are concerned. This also distinguishes him from another major philosopher whose work was also concerned with common sense, namely Wittgenstein (cf. 1969 However, we probably have to read the passage just quoted in a weaker sense:
Whoever asserts that p, also asserts that certainly p, and, with that, also that they know that p. In other words (with "A" for "the speaker asserts that" and "c" for "certainly"):
This reading is more charitable to Moore (also because indexical sentences like "I know that p" do not express propositions, only utterances of such sentences do). Now, 4 This kind of analysis would lend itself to a solution to Moore`s Paradox: "It`s raining but I don`t believe it" would entail "I know it`s raining"; the latter would, according to a standard view of knowledge, entail "I believe it`s raining"; all this would finally lead into the contradiction "I believe it`s raining but I don`t believe it". Again, Moore is honest enough to make it clear that in the end he hasn`t got an argument that would support his claim to know ordinary propositions: "I think I have nothing better to say than that it seems to me that I do know them, with certainty." (44). It is interesting to see that, at least in Defence, Moore has not got much more to offer than the simple statement that he does in fact know ordinary propositions (and that we do, too).
This clearly won`t satisfy the sceptic: Not only would it not convince her but she would probably not even acknowledge that Moore has made a move in the philosophical debate.
It is also remarkable that nowhere here does Moore deal with a sceptical argument like the one mentioned at the beginning (ScA). He also does not offer an anti-sceptical argument with a conclusion which denies that we are in a sceptical scenario, like (ASA):
Why not? In order to see clearer here, let us look at Proof where one might expect some kind of anti-sceptical argument (cf. also Williams 2004, 76, 87-88 for the different aims of
Defence and Proof).
II. A Proof?
Moore`s famous proof of an external world can seem so simple and straightforward that one can easily oversee its tricky aspects. He claims to be able to prove that two human hands exist by "holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, 'Here is one hand', and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, 'and here is another'." (Proof, 146) . In addition, Moore claims to "have proved ipso facto the existence of external things" (Proof, 146; cf. also Certainty, 242-243). 7 -I will start by looking at certain formal aspects of Moore's proof (a, b) and then move on to the core point: Moore's claim that he knows the premise that there is a hand but cannot and does not have to prove that premise (c-f). All this helps us better understand better what Moore was up to and how little that has to do with contemporary "Mooreanism" (g, h).
(a) Question Begging? The most common reaction to this proof is to object that it is question-begging (for a sophisticated revival of that view cf., e.g., Wright 1985 Wright , 2002 cf. also Lemos 2004, 88-91 Also, in accordance with Neo-Mooreans (cf., e.g., Sosa 1999), he agrees with (2s) (cf.
Certainty, 245-247). In contrast to them (and to Four Forms), however, he cannot make up his mind whether one can know one is not dreaming at the moment (cf. Certainty, 247-248, 250). Accordingly, he does not commit himself to (ASA), the typical Neo-Moorean move:
Moore clearly points out that the argument cuts both ways: (ScA) and (ASA) are on a par (Certainty, 247, 250; but cf. also Stroud 1984, 102ff .). Moore does not quite propose metascepticism about (ASA) and (ScA) but comes close to it. He leaves things open almost like a Pyrrhonian. In that sense, too, Moore was not a Moorean. As we will, however, see in the next section, this is still not the whole picture and Moore could say something in favor of (ASA).
However, we have to take Certainty with a grain of salt, given that Moore distanced himself in the Preface to his "Philosophical Papers" from the "bad mistakes" in that paper.
This makes Moore even more enigmatic.
IV. Comparative Advantages?
One more anti-sceptical argument can be found in short remarks here and there. that there is such a theory available to us (but cf. Lycan 2007, 98) .
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Apart from all that, it is dubitable whether common sense and philosophy are (that) different in the first place (cf. also Williams 1996, 44-45, 81-82; Cole 1991, 42 argues that even scepticism is a consequence of common sense; cf. also Coady 2007 "In order to shew that any action is a duty, it is necessary to know both what are the other conditions, which will, conjointly with it, determine its effects; to know exactly what will be the effects of these conditions; and to know all the events which will be in any way affected by our action throughout an infinite future. We must have all this causal knowledge, and further we must know accurately the degree of value both of the action itself and of all the effects; and must be able to determine how, in conjunction with the other things in the Universe, they will affect its value as an organic whole. And not only this: we must also possess all this knowledge with regard to the effects of every possible alternative; and must then be able to see by comparison that the total value due to the existence of the action in question will be greater than that which would be produced by any of these alternatives. But it is obvious that our causal knowledge alone is far too incomplete for us ever to assure ourselves of this result. Accordingly it follows that we never have any reason to suppose that an action is our duty: we can never be sure that any action will produce the greatest value possible." (149) Moore continues that only in the case of very few actions can we make legitimate statements concerning the probability of good outcomes (cf. Principia Ethica, 149-150).
However, he adds with persevering scepticism that "it is plain that even this is a task of immense difficulty. It is difficult to see how we can establish even a probability that by doing one thing we shall obtain a better total result than by doing another." (Principia Ethica, 152). The problem has to do with the infinity of the future (cf. Principia Ethica, 152-152) as well with the general limits of our causal knowledge (cf. Principia Ethica,
159-160).
There is nothing wrong as such with being both an epistemological anti-sceptic and a moral sceptic. But why did Moore not argue for moral common sense and against moral scepticism in a way parallel to his attempts in epistemology? There is indeed such a parallel argument as I will explain soon. Whether Moore thought of it or not -it was good for him not to go down this particular road. The reason is simply that one can turn this parallel between the epistemological argument and the moral argument against Moore´s proof of an external world (as well as against recent Neo-Moorean anti-sceptical strategies). This is what I will try to show now.
The basic idea is straightforward. First, there is a tight structural analogy between
Moore´s proof of an external world (or Neo-Moorean arguments) on the one hand and a certain defence of moral common sense against moral scepticism such that the following seems to hold:
(1) If Moore´s (or the Neo-Moorean) epistemological argument is convincing, then the corresponding moral argument is convincing (2) However, the moral argument is not convincing (3) Hence, the epistemological argument is also not convincing But let us take a closer look.
We can distinguish between two forms of moral scepticism (cf. also SinnottArmstrong 2006 here):
Metaphysical Moral Scepticism: Nothing is morally right or wrong.
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Epistemological Moral Scepticism: Nobody can know whether something (actions, intentions, etc.) is morally right or wrong.
14 13 Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, 36 also calls this "moral nihilism". -A similar thesis can be formulated for other moral terms, like "virtuous", "vicious", "good", "bad", etc. For the sake of simplicity, I will focus on "right" and "wrong" here.
The argument for metaphysical moral scepticism could have the following form (2pw) If here is a hand, then there is an external world (3pw) There is an external world.
The structure of (MW) and (PW) is exactly the same and in both cases all the plausibility of the argument depends on the plausibility of the first premise. (1mw) is not convincing, especially in a debate with the moral sceptic. Why should (1pw) be any more convincing, especially in a debate with the epistemological sceptic? It seems hard to defend acceptance of (PW) together with rejection of (MW). Hence, if we -as we should -reject (MW), we should also reject (PW) or Moore's proof of an external world.
One could argue that that (1mw) is not that implausible after all. However, an argument would be needed which also explains why it seems so hopeless to argue against the moral sceptic using (MW). A better objection would be to say that there is indeed an asymmetry between (MW) and (PW) and that (1mw) is much less plausible than (1pw).
But why? What explains this asymmetry? Is Moore´s hand-premise imore secure than (1mw) simply because the criteria of application for "hand" are much more straightforward and uncontroversial than those for "morally wrong"? Well, the problem here does not seem to have to do at all with problems of correct applications of terms.
Finally, one could try to turn the tables on my argument and run the "reverse" argument: insist that (PW) is plausible, and that since (PW) is plausible (MW) must be plausible, too. However, this way we would still end up with meta-skepticism: There seems to be no way to decide which of the two views is the correct one: the one which defends (MW) using (PW) as support or the one which objects to (PW) using (MW) as a critical weapon. And that alone, one can continue, throws enough skeptical light on (1mw) and on Moore's assumption that there is a hand.
What about epistemological moral scepticism? The argument for it could look like this (taking "R" to stand for a requirement of moral knowledge, such as the ability to rule out alternative moral views or theories):
Argument for Epistemological Moral Scepticism (EMS) (1ems) Nobody can meet R with respect to any claim that something is morally right or wrong (2ems) If one cannot meet R with respect to any claim that something is morally right or wrong, then one cannot know whether it is morally right or wrong (3ems) One cannot know whether something is morally right or wrong.
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A Moorean could reply with an argument for moral knowledge (MK):
(1mk) I know that murder is morally wrong (because I can meet R) (2mk) If I know that murder is morally wrong, then one can know whether something is morally right or wrong (3mk) One can know whether something is morally right or wrong.
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Again, the Moorean argument does not look very convincing (but cf. Lemos 2004, 170-172, 175-179) . Again, the problem seems to be with the first premise (1mk). No moral sceptic would be impressed at all by it and the argument based on it.
Now look at (ASA):
(ASA) (1o) Ko (2o) If Ko, then K(not s) (3o) K(not s).
The structure of (MK) and (ASA) is exactly the same and in both cases all the plausibility of the argument depends on the plausibility of the first premise. (1mk) is not convincing, especially in a debate with the moral sceptic. Why should (1o) be any more convincing, especially in a debate with the epistemological sceptic? It seems hard to defend acceptance of (ASA) together with rejection of (MK). Hence, if we -as we should -reject (MK), we should also reject (ASA) or the recent neo-Moorean template of an anti-sceptical argument (which is not Moore's argument). There are objections parallel to the remarks above on (MW) and (PW) but I won't go into them here.
As I said, Moore himself went a long way towards epistemological moral scepticism (cf., very close to Moore, Butchvarov 1989, 182-184) . Even if his moral scepticism is rather based on scepticism about the applicability of terms like "good" than on some deeper sceptical argument, all this would still support our objection from morality against his proof of an external world even more. It also works against some recent Neo-Moorean arguments against the epistemological sceptic, so it seems. In both cases -epistemological and metaphysical moral scepticism -, the moral sceptic would come to the aid of his epistemological cousin. It is, to say the least, not clear whether Moore or the NeoMooreans can deal with both.
